14. The Ukrainian-Polish Alliance

I returned to Kamyanets hopeful and in good spirits. I was being awaited impatiently because everyone wanted to hear about the chances of resuming war against the Bolsheviks. Col. Udovychenko had already received orders to take command of the 2nd Division, he was in Kamyanets and offered me the post of commander of the 4th infantry brigade. The Division was to be composed of the 4th, 5th and 6th brigade, one artillery brigade and a cavalry regiment with all auxiliary units. We expected to reorganize the whole on this pattern soon. I received Col. Udovychenko's offer with enthusiasm. Col. Shapoval was given a diplomatic appointment.
I had to start assembling personnel again, and new troubles began with uniforms, food, etc. Early in April I moved a nucleus of three battalions to Ivashkivtsi-Borsukivtsi where the brigade was to get recruits from a draft of three age groups in the county of Nova-Ushytsya. The commanders of battalions were: 10th – Capt. Kolodyazh, 11th – Capt. Hrabchenko (my colleague from the 232nd Russian reserve regiment), 12th – Lieut.-Col. Bilan, and Capt. Verekha in charge of the cavalry company. The artillery unit was part of the artillery brigade, and was only tactically under my command, it was commanded by Lieut.-Col. Loburenko. Awaiting supplements, we held daily exercises with the cadres, but even here we had difficulties with lack of arms, particularly machine-guns for technical and tactical exercises. Negotiations between Col. Udovychenko and commander of the 18th Polish Division, General Krajowski, had little effect, since the Polish Division was short of arms, and in spite of the fact that Polish Chief of State Pilsudski, as we learned later, had issued appropriate orders, they never reached Gen. Krajowski.
We received information that the offensive of Polish and Ukrainian forces was to begin on April 24th. But actually we had still neither enough men nor sufficient arms. Out of the entire cadre of the Division Col. Udovychenko formed a separate detachment under my command, consisting of 350 infantry men and two cannon. Together with the 35th Polish Brigade under Colonel Lados, this detachment began an offensive in the direction of Ozaryntsi (north of Mohyliv) via Verbovets. The 2nd Cavalry Regiment of Col. M. Frolov was proceeding along the Dnister river. This regiment with its commander had left the volunteer army of Gen. Bredov, and joined us. In one day our detachment reached the Vendychany-Ozaryntsi-Mohyliv line where we stopped for mobilization and organization, and the 18th Polish Division continued east. The brigade, quartered in the Ozaryntsi region, was soon supplemented with men, armed and uniformed, and organized. The people of Mohyliv tendered the Division a grand reception, and present were also the officers of the 18th Polish Division with General Krajowski and Colonel Lados. The latter, during an appropriate moment, danced a beautiful Cossack dance to loud applause of all Ukrainians.
On May 6th, the Army of the UNR, in the glory of its legendary Winter March and brilliant victories, entered the Mohyliv regions from the rear of the Bolsheviks under heavy fighting. In this fighting, the Army completely annihilated the 14th Soviet Army in the Rybnytsya-Rudnytsi regions. Lightly guarded and without much bother from the enemy, the Army rested in Mohyliv-Yampil regions and reorganized into five infantry and one cavalry divisions and two reserve brigades. At that time our Division got back its old name from the previous year, the 3rd Infantry Iron Division because most of its officers, now headed by General Udovychenko, were the same as in 1919, and the men were from the same localities. My brigade was named No. 7.
About the middle of May I received orders from Gen. Udovychenko to proceed to woods about seven kilometers north of Yampil, and there incorporated in my brigade a Galician detachment of Lieut. Yaremych which managed to join us from behind Bolshevik lines. There were 260 men with machine-guns and equipment. This was another manifestation of the comradeship in arms of the UNR and UHA armies. Galician soldiers were joining us nearly every day, many officers among them. I remember well the fine officer Capt. Dr. Hrynevych who was all bedraggled. To me personally this was new proof of the confidence of the Galicians in me, and Gen. Udovychenko said: "you have always been a patron of the Galicians, and when they learned that you were here, asked to be put in your brigade." I attached this unit to the brigade as the 21st battalion and the rest went into the brigade police company.
Our bivouac in this region lasted until May 27th when the Division received orders to march to the front on the river Markivka line, and the brigade was to hold the Myaskivka-Haryachkivka line. On the day of departure, a delegation of Jews of the city of Ozaryntsi came to me and presented me with a scroll which stated, among others:
"We, the Jews of Ozaryntsi, never had it so peaceful since the revolution of 1917, as during the time when the 7th Brigade was stationed in our vicinity."
The position of the brigade was at the most exposed northern wing of the Army and it maintained liaison with the neighboring Polish units. The whole Army front stretched out for over eighty kilometers. News reached us that the 3rd Polish Army, which included our 6th Infantry Division formed from our men who had been held as prisoners of war by the Poles, had captured Kiev, and that our Commander in Chief had been received by the city of Kiev. At first we did not know why we were not advancing east, but early in June it became known from communiques that the Bolsheviks had massed on the southern front opposite the Poles and us, the mounted Army of Budenny in the region of Lypovets. The Polish command had therefore halted the offensive in order to annihilate Budenny on prepared positions. After several attempts, however, Budenny succeeded in breaking through the Polish front near Samhorodok, and the Poles could not stop him in spite of filling the breach with reserves. A retreat began on the entire front from Kiev to the Dnister, but in spite of the Bolsheviks' huge superiority in numbers, they failed to encircle or destroy any of the Ukrainian or Polish units. The situation became aggravated by the fact of desertions caused by our defeat. True, desertions were not on the mass scale of the previous year because the people had already experienced the Bolshevik "paradise," but nevertheless our ranks thinned. When we entered Galicia in our retreat, large numbers of Galicians went home, too. Another, fairly large part of the 5th Kherson Division crossed the Carpathians into Czechoslovakia.
The brigade experienced heavy fighting against overwhelming enemy forces, particularly against the cavalry near Sydoriv (east of Chortkiv) and along the line of the rivers Seret and Strypa, but we fought back without heavy losses. In the Sydoriv region enemy cavalry succeeded in pushing the 21st battalion out of Vasylkivtsi and it managed to hold on only to the western part of the village. We had to win the position back at all cost because the flanks of neighboring units were threatened. The 19th reserve battalion had orders to recapture Vasylkivtsi, but unfortunately, the commander of the battalion left the village unescorted and encountered enemy cavalry hiding in a land depression before the village. In flight from the sabers of enemy cavalry the battalion rushed back to the village which was only a short way off, but it lost fifteen men, a great loss at the rime when the whole battalion had only sixty men. The loss was a blow on our morale, too. At my request Gen. Udovychenko sent a cavalry company from the 8th brigade and two companies of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment from the division reserve to our aid and our cavalry restored the break. Soon, however, the enemy threw in another huge cavalry group and our Division could not hold out. But finally the Cavalry Division came from our reserve, and together we annihilated the enemy cavalry: the Red Cossack Cavalry Division and the Bashkir Cavalry Brigade. This example shows that the enemy was not superior to us. Our Division fought on this front for nearly two weeks, and orders to withdraw to the river Strypa line came only in connection with the situation on the Polish front.
On the last day before withdrawal to the Strypa line the brigade received reinforcements: a full battalion of 250 men of former POWs in Poland trained in a Polish camp under Capt. Trutenko. I left this battalion intact as the 21st battalion, dividing the 21st battalion among the 20th and 19th. Our withdrawal was very slow and during the night our brigade occupied for defense several villages on the east bank of the Strypa, Capt. Trutenko's battalion taking the whole east end of the large village of Trybukhivtsi. Being completely exhausted, I did not personally supervise placing of patrols, expecting that Capt. Trutenko, an experienced World War I officer, would take care of guarding us for the night. I felt uneasy, however, and my uneasiness was justified: the Bolsheviks attacked Trybukhivtsi during the night and panic ensued. Order was restored, however, when I came to the threatened place with my own men. The battalion held on only to the northern end of the village until morning, and then we crossed to the west bank of the river Strypa. After this event I replaced Capt. Trutenko with Lieut.-Col. Bazylevsky.
To the north, defended by the 1st Zaporozhian Division, enemy cavalry broke through to its rear and threatened our entire front, but there again, the Cavalry Division frustrated the enemy's attempts and inflicted heavy losses on him. Meanwhile the 6th Polish Army which was in operational contact with our Army, withdrew toward Lviv leaving our entire northern wing exposed and this compelled our Command to begin a withdrawal across the Dnister. The withdrawal was completed around August 18th and 19ch after heavy fighting. The brigade, which had been covering the Division in its withdrawal, was ordered to the region of Vynohrad-Yaseniv for a rest, and then it was placed on a sector of the front along the Dnister, with the bridge at Nyzhniv as the center of defense. We had only daily exchange of shots with the enemy, but passive defense was not in the plans of Gen. Udovychenko, and during that period of seven to eight days while we were stationed along the Dnister. We made several night sorties across the river and finally secured the opposite bridgehead and our 3rd Cavalry Regiment made a raid as far as Monasteryska.
Under pressure of circumstance and on demand of our prominent high officers the matter of ranks and promotions was finally taken care of at that time. A special commission was appointed under Gen. M. Yanchevsky which compiled a register of the entire officer corps of the Army for the purpose of determining ranks, and drafted regulations for promotions. I was confirmed in the rank of Captain with full seniority with simultaneous promotion to Colonel for meritorious battle service.
The news reached us only late in August that the Poles had thoroughly beaten the Reds near Warsaw, striking from the river Wieprz against the southern wing of the Bolshevik front which reached from Demblin all the way to Torun. Our Army began preparing for attack and the 3rd Division was moved to the south to Horodenka, where it was to force the Dnister and proceed eastward to capture the line of Skala-Husiatyn. During the course of several nights and under cover of woods our 3rd Battalion of Engineers built planks and pontoons, and in the night of September 15th the 8th Brigade forced the Dnister on pontoons and the 3rd Cavalry Regiment swimming. Enemy sentries were all taken prisoner and the Reds began to retreat in panic. Within four days the Division traversed over 120 kilometers with light skirmishes and crossed the Zbruch again on September 21st. On our own free soil all soldiers not on duty assembled on a hill near Orynin attending Divine Service of thanksgiving for the happy return to the Homeland.
The brigade was in poor condition. In spite of successful attempts to destroy the enemy with the least possible losses to ourselves, our losses accumulated. Some battalions had no more than fifty to sixty men, the 12th had over 100, and the cavalry company had thirty horses. We were hoping that the enemy would not be able to prevent our mobilization of new recruits in the area, and that the Poles Would have better opportunities for supplying us with arms. The enemy was retreating in panic and our Command took full advantage of the situation. Although the Bolsheviks threw in fresh troops soon, we realized that regardless of our exhaustion we had to advance as fast as possible, taking advantage of our good morale. We had the same thing all over again: battles and forced marches, and organization work.
Unexpectedly, however, reports came in that the Poles accepted the Bolsheviks' offer of a cease-fire, and that they were ready to negotiate peace. General Udovychenko was pressing the attack, to gain as much depth in territory as possible for a "breather" and finally the Division pulled far ahead of the right wing of the front, reaching the river Markivka. Our Division and the newly created First Machine-gun Division constituted the Right Army Group of General Udovychenko.
On October 18th came the end of our fighting job on the front along the river Markivka. We had to stop the fight for the liberation of our Homeland because the Poles had signed an armistice which included the entire front of our Army. The Poles had sent their detachments to the line of our front in order to mark that all this was the Polish front. It was quite clear to me that our struggle against the Bolsheviks, considering Red Moscow's potential, had entered into a new stage of crisis. I kept all the ill omens of our situation to myself in order to lift the morale of my troops in expectation of an early renewal of operations because the armistice was valid only until November 10th. The Bolsheviks, I felt, would not keep any promises made to us. The Poles were unable to satisfy our needs for materiel and supplies. We were particularly short of ammunition for the infantry. Our Command had hopes to recover arms and ammunition from the Rumanians which they had taken from the Zaporozhian Corps during the tatter's crossing of Rumania in 1919. Negotiations with the Rumanians ended in their consent to return this property of ours in exchange for sugar which we had available from the Vendychany refinery situated in the region of the 3rd Division. This fact of the Rumanians' trading our own property should be well remembered. At the time, however, this was the only way we could supplement our stock of arms of which we were in dire need since we had several thousand draftees in our mobilization centers. With these arms, and with all the work of our armorers who cleaned and reconditioned arms and ammunition taken from the population, we had only forty to fifty rounds per man and four to six tapes per machine-gun. Rifles were in such worn condition that at a distance of 100 paces the target would be missed by several feet which I observed personally. Regarding clothing, we were somewhat better off than in 1919.
I went to Kamyanets on November 4th to take care of several matters during a week's furlough, but early in the morning of the 12th H. Roytberg (mentioned before) came running to my house in Kamyanets with the news that he barely escaped from encirclement by a Bolshevik brigade. I left for the front right away, but I could only reach Nova Ushytsya, the front being on the river Kalus line. Gen. Udovychenko was extremely busy with the new situation, but he took time to tell me briefly that early in the morning of November 10th the Bolsheviks attacked in great force of cavalry and infantry our 9th Brigade in the region of Sharhorod, made a deep breakthrough and almost annihilated our Division. My brigade suffered particularly heavy losses being attacked by Red Cavalry on the defense line near Chernivtsi, and the General sent the 8th Brigade to help. All ammunition was spent soon and the brigades held the line with bayonets. The enemy could not take Chernivtsi and went around them. In the night the decimated brigades withdrew to Luchynets-Yaryshiv. Some ammunition was supplied by our Army Quartermaster, but the enemy could not be stopped. The Army Staff dispatched the Cavalry Division against the attacking enemy groups, but it suffered heavy losses and could not contain the enemy. With ever fresh forces brought in by the Bolsheviks into battle, we could not regroup the Army and hold the enemy. The Army was in full retreat, but the retreat was orderly so as to prevent encirclement and annihilation. The group withdrew to the Zbruch on the Volochyska-Ozhyhivtsi line and was to cross into Poland on terms agreed upon in advance. For the first time in our fight for independence we had horrible losses and nebulous prospects for the future. In talks with my commanders of battalions and from reports of commanders of other divisions I could piece together the whole situation and our operational mistakes which could have been the cause of all that happened. First of all, my conjecture was quite correct that we should not have waited with launching our offensive until the very last minute of the expiring armistice, all the more so since Polish token forces had been withdrawn on November 3rd. In any event, we would have had the initiative, although, naturally enough, one could predict the outcome of such an offensive. The Army Command did not consent to the proposal made by the commander of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment, M. Frolov, to create a mobile attack group out of all cavalry units and make a deep raid behind enemy lines in October, at a time when the Bolsheviks were concentrating their forces On our front. This would also have been an action of operational intelligence which was not undertaken, we did not even engage in deeper tactical intelligence. As we learned from intelligence reports of the Army Staff, all intelligence was gathered by agents, a system which is always unreliable. The time of year was against us, but it was just as much against the enemy. In men and materiel, however, the enemy was undoubtedly superior to us.9
Thoughts were discussed that the Army might go on another winter march, but it was quite clear that neither the relation of forces nor operational conditions would be in favor of such action, the Bolsheviks being no longer busy on other fronts, as was the case in 1919.
According to data of the Army Staff, as of November 10th the Army held a front from the Dnister near Yampil through Bar to Lityn, i.e. over 120 kilometers. Our numbers were: about 14,000 infantry, about 3,000 cavalry, eighty cannon and a few armored cars. Facing us, the Reds concentrated about 25,000 infantry (the 12th and 14th Army) and about 5,000 cavalry with incomparably stronger artillery and with full technical and materiel supplies.10 Hence, with our experience in waging war against the Bolsheviks and with our determination we could count on some initial success which could have developed into something bigger in connection with the low morale of the Red troops following the defeat at Warsaw. This, however, is merely conjecture, albeit based on logical analysis.
For 11 days in heavy and unequal battles, the Army was withdrawing westward, under cover of thinning cavalry ranks and machine-guns mounted on carts. Our retreat was also covered by the so-called 3rd Russian Army of General Peremykin, formed in Poland under the auspices of the Russian Political Liberation Committee headed by the well-known Russian political leader Boris Savinkov who recognized Ukrainian independence. The forces of that army were too weak, however, to stop the advance of the Reds. Accompanying Gen. Udovychenko, I just managed to get across a bridge at Volochyska on November 21st at night under enemy machine-gun fire. The Bolsheviks did not gain much booty from us because everything that could be moved (trains, horses, artillery) was moved by us to Polish territory.
The war was over, and in spite of wholly unjustified official optimism, I did not see any prospects of a change in the political and military situation in our favor, I did not see any possibility of a new rise to arms.

[9] "Ukrains'ko-Moskovs'ka Viyna v dokumentakh" (The Ukrainian-Muscovite War in Documents), by General V. Salsky and General P. Shandruk. Published by the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Warsaw, 1935.
[10] E. Melikov and M. Kakurin, "Voyna s belopolakami" (The War against the White Poles), Moscow, 1928.

15. In Camps for Internees in Poland

After disarming, we were directed to various camps, built by the Germans for prisoners of war during World War I. The entire 3rd Division travelled several days in unheated freight cars and arrived in Kalisz (Camp No. 10). The first inspection of the camp left us with the impression that after we would get our quarters in order we would manage somehow – we had managed to survive four years of war under conditions that cannot be described. At first I was appointed camp commandant, but several weeks later the 2nd Volhynian Division arrived in camp and a group Commandant was appointed for both Divisions. After a short rest and primitive organization of the lives of about 5,000 people, we were faced with the problem of occupying such a large mass of men massed together, since it is a known fact that even the most disciplined crowd kept idle is apt to produce spiritual and even physical conflicts. The situation was made more difficult because food was pretty poor, the Polish supply command allotting us about 1,400 to 1,500 calories. Clothing worn by our people was simply in catastrophic condition, even some officers could not get up from their beds of boards for days, having nothing to put on. We started to look for a solution because in addition to going hungry ourselves, lice were eating us. Intervention by our diplomatic representatives with the Polish authorities in Warsaw and appeals to welfare organizations like the Y.M.C.A. and B.R.M.11 produced some results: the Y.M.C.A. gave us a certain amount of underwear, linen, clothing, shoes and evaporated milk for children (at least 2,000 women and children had been evacuated together with the Army, and soon more children were born in camps). The Poles gradually increased quantity and quality of food and assigned some money for needed medical supplies. But in order to stop feeding idlers, the Poles offered group work, e.g. in sawmills, on large estates, in sugar refineries, etc. Many soldiers took advantage of the offer and thus, the 3rd Cavalry Regiment went to work in the sawmill in Suwalki, and the 20th Battalion to the Bialowiezka Puszcza hunting preserve. We also established various trade schools and shops: carpentry, tailoring, shoemaking. An old officer, Col. Melnykiv was in charge of these in our camp. The Y.M.C.A. organized an embroidery enterprise for the women which provided a modest income for beautiful work. Modest indeed, for example: an artistically embroidered tablecloth with 12 napkins, over which a woman had to work four to five weeks, including long nights with candle-light, fetched only five to six dollars in equivalent Polish currency. In addition, painters' studios were organized and our painters sold pretty paintings which sometimes found buyers out of charitable motive. Selling paintings all over the country created a numerous class of "travelling salesmen" who improved their own and their suppliers' standard of living. This was the material side of the case.
The spiritual side was very well and constructively organized. First of all, each camp built its own church in the barracks from the internees' own funds. In our camp the first chaplain was the Chaplain of the 7th Brigade Rev. P. Pyatachenko, then Chief Army Chaplain Very Rev. P. Pashchevsky, well-known for his patriotic sermons. Later schools of general education were established (grade, supplemental, courses, etc.), and even a high school in which I taught history, geography and French. This work was conducted by cultural-educational department of divisions under the general chairmanship of our esteemed professor, the Hon. V.K. Prokopovych, former Ukrainian Minister of Education. Lieut.-Col. M. Derkach was in charge of the cultural-educational department in our camp and contributed much time and effort to this work.
In the meantime the Bolsheviks took advantage of the still confused conditions in the young Polish Republic, and in spite of the peace treaty signed in Riga, they organized armed bands which attacked villages across the Polish border, burning and devastating entire settlements. The raids sometimes penetrated to a depth of fifteen kilometers into Poland. General Yu. Tyutyunyk, the well known organizer of uprisings against the Bolsheviks in Ukraine wanted to make the best of this confusion along the border, and got the consent of our Commander in Chief to organize a raid into Ukraine. He assembled a large detachment of volunteers who were willing to organize a rebellion in Ukraine, and he kept these activities secret from the Polish authorities. Preparations were under way in March 1921, but due to the necessity to keep them secret and technical obstacles, the raid was delayed. The rebel group which called itself "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (UPA) was able to start from the forests of Podilla and Polissya only late in October, when weather conditions were absolutely unsuitable for such operations. The most important problem was arms and transportation because Gen. Tyutyunyk's plans quite justly called for speedy movement deep into Ukraine, in order to surprise the enemy and prevent possible encirclement. The only chance to capture arms was to stage a surprise attack on one of the border garrisons. The group, divided into two detachments, crossed the border early in November, destroyed Bolshevik defense posts on the border, and captured some arms and horses. Moving quickly, the main force under Gen. Tyutyunyk's personal command reached the city of Korosten (over 100 kilometers east of the border) within two days. In a surprise attack on the enemy garrison, and after heavy battle, they took the city of Korosten and made it a base for further operations. Gen Tyutyunyk intended to attack Kiev from there, and then turn south in order to join other insurgent groups which were still active in the southern part of Kiev province. If this action had been started at a different time of year, rebellion would probably have spread all over Ukraine where life under the Bolsheviks was very hard, the conquerors repressing all passive resistance and active rebellion of the Ukrainian people. The Bolsheviks, however, took a successful gamble: they threw the cavalry Division of Kotovsky into the fight to encircle Gen. Tyutyunyk, part of the Ukrainian force which was already near Kiev, had to withdraw to the west under heavy snow and cold weather. Enemy cavalry encircled the group completely near the village of Mynky. A part fought its way out, but 359 soldiers were taken prisoner. When our soldiers rejected the Reds' offer to serve in the Red Army, they were tried by court-martial and sentenced to death by firing squad. They went to their death in the city of Novy Bazar singing the Ukrainian National Anthem. Another group, under Col. S. Paliy Sydoryansky which was under enemy attack from the very moment that it crossed the border, luckily fought its way back into Poland. They were interned by the Polish authorities along with the remaining men of Gen. Tyutyunyk's group.
We had a diplomatic mission in Czechoslovakia since 1919, and at its request the Government consented to admit a large number of our scholars and to establish many scientific and educational institutions, as the Pedagogical Institute, Husbandry Academy, Free University, high school and different courses. There the Ukrainian Civic Committee was headed by the well-known pre-war Ukrainian leader M. Shapoval, a man full of energy, but politically one-sided as a former member of the party of socialists-revolutionaries, and this had a certain effect on his selection of pedagogues and school personnel. Later, M. Shapoval's party fervor became less acute. When news about educational opportunities in Czechoslovakia reached our soldiers, they began to seek opportunities to get there. My soldiers came to me for advice, and I openly advised them to go to Czechoslovakia instead of sitting around in camp wasting time in expectation of a change of the political situation, an expectation I thought entirely unwarranted. The Ukrainian Civic Committee offered advice how to cross the Polish-Czechoslovakian border illegally. The border was crossed in the Carpathian mountains with receiving points set up on the other side. Both governments, the Polish and Czechoslovakian, probably knew about this and kept one eye shut because there was not a single instance of anyone being caught on the border. Thus, first the young people went in large masses to Czechoslovakia, followed by their elders, but by then we had gained the right to travel on passports. One of those who went to Czechoslovakia and graduated from the Husbandry Academy in Podebrady was my former chief of staff, Lieut.-Col. D. Linytsky. My attitude in the matter of the soldiers' departure to study in Czechoslovakia created some unpleasantness for me because our "camp command" wanted to have "an army" – since without an army their ranks were becoming meaningless. For this reason the commanders thought that I was doing "subversive work" and wanted to compromise me. I also wished to go abroad, even to walk west, but during an audience with the Commander in Chief on the occasion of my promotion to General (early in 1925), he prohibited me from leaving Poland by reason of future possibilities. Hence, with the departure of men for studies and for jobs, life in the camps began more tolerable for the rest, with better food and more clothing available.
Concerning our organized activities it should be noted that on the initiative of General Salsky, the Ukrainian Military Society (UWET) was established, subsequently changed into the Association of former Soldiers of the UNR Army; it existed until the outbreak of World War II, when it was liquidated by the Germans.
At that time I became interested in military literature, and this was the beginning of my modest contributions to Polish military magazines "Bellona," "Przeglad Wojskowy," and "Polska Zbrojna," and to the French magazine "Revue des Deux Mondes." At the same time I conceived the idea of publishing a Ukrainian military-historical magazine in order to preserve our historical and military material and to shed at least some light on the epic of our armed effort. I talked the matter over with Gen. Kushch and Professor Prokopovych and they supported my project. Gen. Kushch became chief editor, and I was secretary. The name of the journal was "Tabor" (Camp), and it was our military-historical journal, and later military-scientific. This publication also existed until World War II. I contributed several dozen articles to it, including a tactical assignment within the framework from a platoon to an infantry regiment. A Course for Staff Officers was founded in our camp on orders of Gen. Salsky, and I taught applied tactics and topography, and also took part in tactical games. The Courses were headed by Staff General, Lt.-Gen. S. Dyadyusha. From among my students I remember Captains V. Shevchenko, A. Shevchenko and P. Orel-Orlenko, I had a very interesting encounter with the last-named later. When the housing shortage tapered off I proposed that we establish an officers club. It was decorated in Ukrainian style by our best painters: V. Dyadynyuk, M. Zhukiv and Ya. Shcherbak. Various military adages and sayings of famous military leaders were inscribed on the walls, with a portrait of S. Petlura on the main wall. Under it was the renowned call of Garibaldi to his soldiers.
On their part, the Bolsheviks did not leave us in peace, either. In 1922 a Soviet mission visited the camp several times to talk our soldiers into returning home. Pursuant to the Polish-Soviet agreement it had the right to appeal to the soldiers directly. In our camp all the residents were assembled in the square and in reply to the delegates' call for return to the homeland, there was deep silence, not one came forward and this probably happened in all camps, of which there were seven. The Bolsheviks did not address our soldiers any more. They resorted to a different method: they tempted people individually. We learned later that one of such traitors was no less a person than deputy chief of staff of our Division, Captain Makarenko: he left for Warsaw one day without warning and even took with him part of the staff documents. He began writing letters to officers trying to convince them to go home. There was another case in my Brigade: Lt.-Col. Nechytailo went to take a job in the Carpathians in 1922, but several weeks later he came to me with a letter from his wife and from Otaman I. Kobza. The latter had been temporary commander of the Slobidsky Corps in 1919 and a friend of Nechytailo, as both had been members of the Democratic Peasants Party. The letters urged him to return home immediately because he was assured of a pardon, and his wife with three children certainly needed his help. Lt-Col. Nechytailo asked me for advice. I told him to weigh the matter very carefully before making his final decision, cautioning him that the Bolsheviks never kept their word, and emphasizing that the report of Mr. Kobza about new favorable conditions under the Bolsheviks in Ukraine sounded rather strange. Nevertheless, he decided to go. Subsequently we had news that he never even reached his home, but was sent to the concentration camp in Kolyma together with Kobza. The General Yu. Tyutyunnyk, mentioned before, the well-known commander of the 4th Kiev Division and leader of a partisan detachment 6,000 strong, who had joined our Army in August 1919 and gained a great reputation in Ukraine, also went home on an individual pardon. At first he was manager of a tannery in the Volga region, but later he was reported to have been executed.
It can be stated generally that during the period to 1926, all our interned soldiers in Poland proved themselves to be of the best caliber in every respect. They kept their patriotic spirit, high morale, and military discipline, based, under existing circumstances, mainly on mutual confidence and respect.
The year 1926 was a turning point in the position of Ukrainian emigres. Marshal Pilsudski came to power in Poland in May. After a few months we felt a changed attitude toward us on the part of official Polish circles. Before that, Chief of the Polish General Staff, General S. Szeptycki told our General V. Salsky: "Get out of Poland, you loafers!" Late in 1926, General V. Salsky presented Marshal Pilsudski with a memorandum in the name of the UNR Government on the necessity: (1) to make military preparations for the future, (2) on the care of our disabled men and old officers, (3) on formal approval of a Ukrainian civic committee to have the right to act throughout Poland and take care of our emigres, and (4) on transfer to our management of the camp at Kalisz, to serve as a home for our sick and older soldiers. All these matters were gradually approved by the Polish authorities. First of all, formal sanction was granted to the Ukrainian Central Committee (U.Ts.K.) with branches in all localities with a concentration of our emigres. Ukrainian emigres were given legal status and the right to use so-called Nansen passports. The Kalisz camp was transferred to our independent administration and renamed "Ukrainian Station", other camps were abolished and all emigres unable to work found defuge in it. The U.Ts.K. appointed a Board to manage the Station, consisting of: Gen. Salsky, chairman, Gen. Kushch, his deputy, myself, as chief of housing and administration and Gen. H. Bazylsky, as chief of supply. Within one year we rebuilt nearly all the barracks into separate homes, and modestly furnished. Separate homes were for the men with families, and some dormitories were set up for single men. Gen. Bazylsky was in charge of food, with a special commission elected every six months taking care of the kitchens. At that time I proposed that we conduct courses for chauffeurs at the Station, the proposition was accepted by the U.Ts.K. and funds assigned for the purchase of two used cars and a repair shop. I gave instruction in driving and mechanical repairs. Within two years we schooled fifty-seven chauffeurs and they got their licenses from the Examining Board in Lodz. The U.Ts.K. also received formal license for the Station High School which existed until the outbreak of World War II and had over 250 graduates.
Early in 1928 more requests presented by us were granted by Marshal Pilsudski. Our disabled men were placed on a nearly equal footing with Polish invalids, and after going through examination by a qualifying commission, they were granted modest pensions.

[11] British Relief Mission.

16. Staff of the Ministry of Military Affairs

Our greatest achievement was the establishment, in March 1927, of a completely secret Staff of the Ministry of Military Affairs. The Staff was composed of three sections: (1) Organizational Section; (2) Intelligence; (3) Propaganda. General V. Kushch was appointed Chief of Staff, and I was put in charge of Section one. Gen. V. Zmienko was chief of the 2nd Section and Professor L. Chykalenko of the 3rd. All sections were located in apartments in Warsaw, absolutely unknown to the police, and part of the 2nd Section was somewhere in the eastern border zone. The task of the 1st Section was to prepare the soldiers living in dispersed places to mobilize in one place in the event of a change in the political situation, and to inform them about military affairs and our future needs and possibilities. For this purpose, we had to establish contact not only with groups of soldiers now in civilian status, but even with individual men. We had to prepare mobilization data (mobilization plan and register) considering our position of emigres, organizational data (ranks of individuals, qualifications for jobs), estimate of indispensable arms, technical and material equipment, training material, logistics, etc. For greater secrecy the 1st Section was ostensibly engaged in collection of historical material and its publication, and the tribunes for this were the magazine "Tabor" and a weekly "Tryzub" (Trident) published in Paris under the editorship of Professor Prokopovych.
On May 25, 1926 on a street in the Montmartre section of Paris, the Bolshevik agent Schwartzbart killed the defenseless Simon Petlura with seven bullets. This coincided with the moment of Marshal Pilsudski's accession to power in Poland. From this it is clear that the Bolsheviks had been keeping an eye on Petlura all the time, but he would not hide, in spite of warnings of our Government and of all our older officers. From the comparison of these events one can reach the conclusion that Petlura was a very dangerous enemy of Bolshevism, primarily because he was the symbol of the nation's political aspirations, and the most popular figure in Ukraine. The Bolsheviks obviously hoped that with Petlura's death there would be a complete breakdown among Ukrainian emigres and of national-political aspirations in Ukraine. They were wrong to the extent that they had to resort to action of physical extermination of the resisting population of Ukraine, by means of the artificial famine of 1932-33. They were wrong again because after Petlura's death, a wide network of conspiracy was established in Ukraine under the name "Soyuz Vyzvolennya Ukrainy" (Association for Liberation of Ukraine), composed of the most select group of idealistic Ukrainian intellectuals under the leadership of Academician professor Serhiy Yefremov. Among emigres, political leadership passed according to the Constitution to one of our most eminent political leaders, the late Prime Minister A.M. Livytsky, no less active in continuing efforts in behalf of Ukraine. All Ukrainian emigres rallied around him in the tragic moment, and he was also the representative of the Association for Liberation of Ukraine in the West.
Schwartzbart was tried in Paris in 1927, free on bail furnished by the Bolsheviks. Nearly all our political leaders, under A.M. Livytsky, went from Poland and Czechoslovakia to attend the trial. The French court freed Schwartzbart, and we should remember this.
The leading spirit and direct leader of our political activities in the world, and particularly in Poland and Czechoslovakia was our new President, A.M. Livytsky, a man of high personal culture, boundless energy, huge erudition and initiative, a man who knew how to appraise current political conditions, foresee them, and properly utilize them. A.M. Livytsky activated the UNR Government, bringing into it, in addition to the eminent Minister of Foreign Affairs, professor A. Choulgine, professor R.S. Smal-Stocki as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in direct charge of all diplomatic activities of the Government in Warsaw, the late professor O. Lototsky, the late professor A. Yakovliv, and others. Thanks to President Livytsky, the B.U.D. (Brotherhood of Ukrainian Statehood) broadened its activities, working as the representation of the Association for Liberation of Ukraine in the West.12 I had the honor of being made a member of B.U.D. by the unanimous decision of the members. The B.U.D. functioned as the supreme decisive factor of Ukrainian internal and external emigre politics until the outbreak of World War II, when it was liquidated by the Gestapo.
In August 1927, the Staff of the Ministry of Military Affairs was reorganized. I was made nominal chief of Staff, retaining my position of chief of the 1st Section. Gen. Kushch devoted all his time to the magazine "Tabor," which became a monthly. The 1st Section consisted of several subsections, I headed the subsection of mobilization and organization, Col. A. Kmeta was in charge of training and liaison with "school groups" which were actually mobilization centers; Lt.-Col. 0. Vyhovsky kept statistics and personnel files of our officer corps; Major I. Zvarychuk was secretary of the Section and my assistant. I was a charge of the Section until 1936.
In 1928, we started assigning our officers to foreign armies as contract officers for the purpose of preparing them for senior commanders. Officers were selected during conferences presided over by President A.M. Livytsky and participated in by Generals V. Salsky, V. Kushch, M. Bezruchko, V. Zmienko and myself. We selected people having the best qualifications and relatively young. By 1936 we had assigned fifty-seven officers to the Polish Army in rank from lieutenant to lieutenant-colonel, two officers to the French Army, and one each to the Finnish and Turkish Army. In addition, several officers obtained permission from the Minister of Military Affairs to enroll in private courses for staff officers conducted by General Golovin in Paris. For purposes of secrecy several officers were given aliases. The work and service of those officers was under direct supervision of Gen. Salsky, and all correspondence was handled by the 1st Section. It gives me real satisfaction to state here that the selection of officers was excellent, and, with the exception of two instances, the attitude of the respective foreign commands and their officer-colleagues was the most courteous, particularly in Poland. According to Polish Army regulations, annual reports were issued on officers up for promotion, and those on our officers were so impartial and favorable that I, knowing these men personally, could not have issued any better. Then we also succeeded in getting some of our officers through the Polish High Command and General Staff College, and one of them, Colonel P. Samutyn finished it with exceptionally high grades. On my request, Col. Samutyn was assigned to my Section for three months to help in current work and apply his newly gained knowledge to our Section. Our graduates of the Staff College were assigned to the General Staff. The work of my section, in addition to current matters and handling correspondence on behalf of the Minister of Military Affairs, produced under my direction some results but unfortunately merely of a theoretical nature. Thus, we made a complete re-registration, including all personal and service data, of about 4,000 officers and about 900 non-commissioned officers. We worked out a mobilization plan with mobilization centers and time schedules for assembling our men and gradual retraining. All programs of training were worked out, based on our experience and Polish, French and German manuals, with our own traditional forms of arms and tactical training intact. I personally worked out a manual-of-arms for the infantry and rules for garrison troops, excising from them old and obsolete forms which we had copied from Russian manuals. Drafts of these manuals were sent to all our centers and to experienced officers for their comments, and all their remarks, with the exception of one officer's who had submitted his highly personalized views, were incorporated in the final text. Later I started on a field-service-manual, but this was never finished. The biggest job was classification of all units, (O.D.B.) from a platoon to an infantry division, with all its component parts, artillery, cavalry, armored units, engineers' detachments, liaison, intelligence, and logistics. We calculated all the necessary funds for arms, uniforms, food, and transportation, and figured norms of pay. The complete draft of this classification was about 350 pages long. As far as I can recall, we also planned formation of light, mobile divisions and our plan called for about 400 officers in each division while Soviet and Polish divisions at the time had each over 600 officers.
No lesser work of organization was performed with the so-called "school groups," i.e. concentrations of our former soldiers. I have already noted that through this organization we were able to keep in touch with nearly all soldiers and as far as possible we encouraged them to study military literature. Although the Staff had very modest financial means, we equipped each group with a fair-sized military library, chiefly in Polish and Russian, and we kept replenishing these libraries. The total number of our "school groups" in Poland was above seventy, with several more in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, France, and Belgium. Some groups held periodic meetings encouraged by the Staff, and they discussed what they had been reading. Other groups were less active, this depended mainly on the commanding officers in charge. I visited groups that displayed only paper activities and removed commanders of such groups. A tactical assignment published in "Tabor" evoked a lot of interest, but some officers solved the problem in favor of the "Blue" side without waiting for new developments to be published which would influence the situation.
I succeeded in assembling a large military library for our Staff, and as of the time of my departure from the Staff, it had over 400 volumes by such authors as F. Foch, A. Diaz, M. Kukiel, Fuller, Svechin, Kakurin, Sikorski, Stachiewicz and others, and of course, von Clausewitz. All historical-operational and tactical studies published in Polish were supplied to us by the Historical Bureau free of charge.
As I had noted, our daily work was covered under activities of historical research of our recent past. This was done in the Polish Bureau of Military History, whose chief was General J. Stachiewicz, a man highly esteemed by Polish military circles, and who was a very hard worker in spite of his advanced stage of tuberculosis. He was a real gentleman, highly cultured and of profound military erudition and a retentive memory. A former member of Pilsudski's Legion, General Stachiewicz was completely at home with the Ukrainian problem and I never found it difficult to enlist his support of our work. Our relations were such that shortly before his death he presented me with his portrait, inscribed "To my dear General Shandruk." Staff-Colonel E. Perkowicz was Gen. Stachiewicz's aide. Born in Bila Tserkva in Ukraine near Kiev, he was a true friend of mine and a defender of the Ukrainian cause. He spoke Ukrainian beautifully and had such a command of Ukrainian literature that he could recite from memory Shevchenko's Haydamaky, Kavkaz, Zapovit, and other poems. Due to Gen. Stachiewicz's poor health. Col. Perkowicz discussed many problems with me, and things were all the more easy since he was an experienced field and staff officer. Col. Perkowicz was a man of very strong character and unshaken faith in Ukrainian independence, he preached Ukrainian-Polish friendship and the necessity of an alliance between the two in defense against Moscow. At that time I was preparing for publication my book "The Ukrainian-Muscovite War Documents" edited and published by the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Warsaw, and Col. Perkowicz wrote a special study on the basis of this book. New circumstances existing in 1938, did not permit publication of his work. Subsequently Gen. Stachiewicz's place as chief of the Bureau was taken by Staff-Colonel T. Rakowski, also a fine gentleman and a soldier of great merit. We also had many dealings with the Nationality Division of the Polish General Staff, under direct command of a great gentleman Staff-Colonel T. Pelczynski (later General, Chief of Staff of General T. Bor-Komorowski, Commander of the Polish Home Army (Armia Krajowa or AK) during the late stages of World War II). Lt-Col. Charaszkiewicz was division chief, and in direct charge of our affairs was Capt. W. Guttrie. We also had dealings with Minister Col. T. Schaetzel, and our Government with the well-known Polish leader T. Holowko. I mention these people because they had faith in the Ukrainian cause as compatible with Poland's essential interests and did not falter from the straight path of aiding us in our efforts.
Along the line of civilian contacts which I knew well from reports read at meetings of the Board of B.U.D., we also had real friends in the persons of Senator S. Siedlecki, Senator Colonel Adam I. Koc, former Minister L. Wasilewski, director of the Eastern Institute S. Paprocki, and others. Among the younger Polish generation were such adherents of aid to Ukraine in her liberation struggle as the distinguished newspapermen W. Baczkowski and J. Gedroyc. I had ample opportunity to speak with those leaders and I always found them to be uncompromising in their understanding of our cause. Naturally, we also had not so much enemies among the Poles, as people who simply ignored us or considered us merely as "Ruthenians" i.e. as people without a legitimate claim to nationhood. I mention them and their attitude because during the course of my duties I was able to observe them at close range.
At that time the "Prometheus" organization came into existence, uniting official and community representatives of all emigre groups of nations formerly under Russia which proclaimed their independence in 1917-1918, but were again under the occupation of Moscow. Professor R. Smal-Stocki was permanent chairman of "Prometheus" and he made me a member of its Ukrainian division. Under the excellent leadership of Prof. Smal-Stocki "Prometheus" united within its ranks so many active leaders of Moscow-enslaved nations that Moscow made numerous demands of its liquidation upon the governments of Poland and France, where it was most active. In addition to uniting emigre representatives of about twenty-three nations, "Prometheus" found a way to maintain liaison with underground organizations in their respective homelands. The permanent secretary of "Prometheus" was the very active leader from North-Caucasus, Eng. Mr. Balo Bilarti. After the occupation of Poland, the Germans dispersed "Prometheus" and did the same later in France, but nevertheless it still maintains a representation in the West.
The Polish Bureau of Military History began publication of the Polish Military Encyclopedia in 1934. Its editor was the well-known Polish historian Major Otton Laskowski, and he offered that I take part in composing Ukrainian parts of the Encyclopedia, which I readily accepted. I worked on about eighty articles, of which I mention the most important: Khmelnytsky, Doroshenko, the Battle of Poltava, Cossacks, Konotop, Kuban, Sahaydachny, the Armies of the UNR and UHA, the Chortkiv Offensive, Nyzhniv, Mohyliv Pod., S. Petlura, A. Livytsky, V. Salsky, M. Bezruchko, Yu. Tyutyunyk, etc. All my articles were published in the Encyclopedia without change of my interpretation of facts. The work also served as a cover for my other work.

[12] B.U.D. – had been organized in 1919-1920 in Kiev.